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Introduction 
 
Price squeeze has been an important issue in the telecommunications market as many 
incumbent operators have exercised this strategy in order to foreclose competitive 
entrants (see Polo (2008), Bravo and Siciliani (2007), Geradin and O’Donoghue 
(2005) and Crocioni and Veljanovski (2003). The experience in all European cases 
considered in these studies shows the difficulty and complexity faced by regulators in 
implementing the imputation analysis. In the US some Courts have followed a 
different approach and some authors do not consider margin squeeze as an abuse by a 
dominant operator (see also Crandall and Singer (2007), Carlton (2008) and Sidak 
(2008)). The role of the present paper is to examine critically the decision of the 
Greek regulator on a price squeeze allegedly applied by the Greek incumbent OTE 
through its subsidiary OTEnet on the market for broadband services. In doing so, a 
number of important questions arise: Why the regulator used the REO test instead of 
the EEO test that has been applied in almost all antitrust cases? What is a legitimate or 
sufficient margin under which a margin squeeze occurs? Can a price squeeze lead to 
falling market shares for the incumbent and rising market shares for the entrants? 
Should the NCA intervene just after one year from the opening of the market?  In this 




What is a margin squeeze?  
 
In general, a margin squeeze exists when a dominant vertically integrated operator sets its 
wholesale and/or retail prices at levels that do not give a reasonable margin to its 
downstream competitors (see Crocioni and Veljanovski (2003).  According to the 
European Commission “Notice”: “A price squeeze exists if “the dominant company’s 
own downstream operations could not trade profitably on the basis of the upstream 
price charged to its competitors by the upstream operating arm of the dominant 
company”(see European Commission (2002b). The crucial factor is the margin 
between the wholesale and retail price and not the absolute value of each one price. 
Below are some definitions of margin squeeze that the European Commission has 
applied in recent cases. 
According to the European Commission Decision (2003b) in the Deutsche Telecom 
case: “a margin squeeze exists if the charges to be paid to DT for wholesale access… 
are so expensive that competitors are forced to charge their end users prices higher 
than the prices DT charges its own end users for similar services. If wholesale charges 
are higher than retail charges, DT’s competitors, even if they are at least as efficient 
as DT, can never make a profit…”. Also according to the CFI (2008) in the same 
case: “If the applicant’s retail prices are lower than its wholesale charges, or if the 
spread between the applicant’s wholesale and retail charges is insufficient to enable 
an equally efficient operator to cover its product-specific costs of supplying retail 
access services, a potential competitor who is just as efficient as the applicant would 
not be able to enter the retail access services market without suffering losses”. 
A similar approach has been taken by the Commission in the Telefonica case: “… a 
margin squeeze is an insufficient margin between the price of an upstream product A 
and a price of a downstream product A+B of which A is a component…It is this 
difference and not the specific level of the retail and/or wholesale prices which is of 
importance in margin squeeze cases”(see Commission Decision (2007).   3
 
Here arises the crucial question. What insufficient means? If we adopt the definition 
provided by Carlton (2008) then an entrant will exit the downstream market as it will 
be not be able to compete profitably: “A price squeeze occurs when a vertically 
integrated firm supplies an input to its downstream competitors at a price that 
generates a profit margin so low that the competitors exit the downstream market.”  
 
 However, there remains the issue of timing. Given a margin squeeze, will the entrant 
continue operating with a loss and for how long? Or will the entrant exit the market 
once margin squeeze is applied by the incumbent? These questions are important 
since they are related to the opening of the downstream market to competitors and to 
whether the NCA should intervene promptly to allegations of margin squeeze or wait 
until the market matures as we will see below.  Furthermore, as Sidak (2008) points 
out “…attempting to implement regulatory policy through section 2 of the Sherman 
Act is ill-advised, both because it makes no sense for courts to re-regulate 
deregulated or lightly regulated industries, and because courts lack the institutional 
competence to implement regulation”. On the other hand a crucial question arises: 
what should be the remedy? How the regulator should set the “sufficient” margin? In 
this paper we attempt to shed some light on these issues based on a recent margin 
squeeze case in the Greek telecoms market.  
 
Recent margin squeeze cases in Telecommunications  
 
Wanadoo Interactive has been fined for predatory pricing. France Telecom's Internet 
access subsidiary, Wanadoo, had charged predatory prices for its consumer broadband 
internet access services. The company was not vertically integrated so the case was 
one of predation instead of a margin squeeze (see Commission Decision (2003a). In 
2003 Telecom Italia, the incumbent telecom operator, abused its dominant position in 
the market of fixed line telecom services. The practices involved a price squeeze in 
the procurement for the provision of telecom services to the Public Administration 
and the use of restrictive vertical contracts with the top business clients. The 
wholesale interconnection services were regulated, while retail prices to the Public 
Administration were unregulated and were determined through a procurement 
auction. Telecom Italia accused for bidding below costs (see Polo (2007). 
The European Commission found that between September 2001 and December 2006, 
the margin between Telefonica’s retail prices and the prices for wholesale broadband 
access at the regional and national level was insufficient to cover the costs of an 
operator as efficient as Telefonica (see European Commission (2007)). Furthermore, 
according to the European Commission, Deutsche Telekom from 1998 to 2001 has 
infringed Article 82 EC by operating abusive pricing in the market for direct access to 
its fixed telephone network in the form of a margin squeeze. DT was charging its 
competitors prices for regulated wholesale access that were higher than its prices for 
retail access to the local network (see European Commission (2003) and  CFI (2008)). 
 
In the present paper we are going to present a recent margin squeeze case applied by 
OTE, the Greek incumbent operator. OTE was fined €20m for abusing its dominant 
position by applying margin squeeze in the market for retail broadband access to the 
internet for a period of 14 months (December 2004 to March 2006). OTE buys from 
its subsidiary ISP OTEnet a fast internet product called Conn-X that sells to the final 
consumers. Margin squeeze was non-discriminatory (see ERG 2009).   4
In its decision, the Greek National Regulatory Authority (EETT) which also serves as 
the NCA for the telecoms market, examined three markets: 1) Market for wholesale 
broadband access through the DSL network of the incumbent, 2) Market for retail 
broadband access through xDSL and 3) Market for retail broadband access to the 
Internet through xDSL. The NRA decided that the squeeze took place in the second 
and third market which it considered as one market. The reason provided by the NRA 
is that all ISPs supply their services bundled i.e. access to retail broadband plus 
Internet services. The NRA didn’t consider the LLU as a substitute for wholesale 
access through xDSL following the Commission’s decision in Telefonica. The NRA 
has tried to establish dominance in this market even though views are conflicting on 
this issue as Crocioni and Veljanovsky (2003) and Motta and Streel (2003) regard that 
dominance is not necessary in the downstream market since the incumbent can 
leverage its power in the wholesale market to the market for fast internet, whereas 
Faull and Nikpay (1999) and Bellamy and Child (2001) regard that dominance is 
necessary in the downstream market. It must be noted that in all European cases 
referred above the incumbent was dominant in the downstream market. 
In the 1
st market the incumbent has a 100% market share as it is the incumbent 
operator that offers wholesale broadband access. In the second market the share of the 
incumbent falls in 2006 to 54.3% from 81.5% in 2006. On the other hand, for the 
same period the share of the alternative providers increases to 36.3% from 18.2%. In 
the second and third markets considered as one, the market share of the incumbent 
falls in the same period from 70.2% to 59.1% and those of the alternative providers 
increase from 29.8% to 40.87%. In the third market for internet services the 
incumbent through its subsidiary OTEnet has the second largest market share. 
It is well known (see ERG (2009)  that there are two imputation tests that can be 
applied to test for a margin squeeze. The first test known as the Equally Efficient 
Operator (EEO) test is based on the costs of the incumbent:  If  Pi -  r  ≥   di  then there 
is no margin squeeze, where r = wholesale price of essential input, Pi = downstream 
retail price of incumbent and di = downstream costs of incumbent. The second test 
known as the Reasonably Efficient Operator (REO) test is based on the costs of the 
entrant: If  Pi -  r  ≥   de  then there is no margin squeeze where r = wholesale price of 
essential input, Pi = downstream retail price of incumbent and de = downstream costs 
of entrant. In the present case the NRA used the second test, as the data provided by 
the incumbent were incomplete. However, it is known that (see ERG (2009) the 
second test is used in mature markets where the aim of the regulator is to promote 
competition. That wasn’t the case as the market was operating for 14 months and 
therefore, it wasn’t mature. 
The net present value calculated for a period of 5 years was -4.4m € or the cost of 
REO per customer is almost double its respective revenue per customer. Therefore, 
the NRA concluded that the incumbent had a set a margin squeeze that would put 
barriers to entry for alternative competitors. However, there are certain limitations to 
the REO approach:  
1)  It does not provide a clear way of calculating the downstream costs of a 
hypothetical "reasonably efficient" entrant. 
2)  It may attract a non-efficient entrant and may provide proof of margin squeeze 
when the non-efficient entrant has very high costs. 
3)  It is inconsistent with the first test, which in fact has always been used by the 
European Commission and the Community Courts. 
4)  It does not assist in cases where the incumbent operator is more efficient than 
the entrants or some of the entrants are more efficient than others.    5
5)  It is in contrast with the rule of competition law. Margin squeeze is based on 
ex ante assumptions and forecasts rather than on ex post facts. 
 
Furthermore, the incumbent states that there are several flaws in the analysis 
conducted by the NRA which alter significantly the NPV (see PwC (2007)): 
 
1) The estimation of terminal or residual value of REO after 5 years, based on its 
liquidation value underestimates the NPV instead of using other methods for an 
ongoing firm (multiple approach or stable growth model approach). 
2) If the estimation of terminal value is based on a perpetual stable growth model 
even at 0%  growth rate, then the NPV becomes positive at 45m € (PwC). 
3) Estimation of WACC based on pre-tax instead of after-tax revenues. 
4) Higher wholesale broadband access prices than the ones proposed by the 
incumbent. 
5) Other flaws of minor importance that produce a positive NPV of 5.8m €.  
 
Apart from the limitations of the REO test, there remains the question of what is an 
insufficient margin. In the provision of wholesale broadband access the incumbent has 
set quantity discounts for the entrants as follows: 
Initial margin = 15% between wholesale and retail prices of the incumbent, plus: 
4% up to 985 ADSL lines 
6% up to 3700 ADSL lines 
8% up to 7500 ADSL lines 
10% up to 15000 ADSL lines 
12% up to 30000 ADSL lines 
15% up to 100000 ADSL lines 
 
The average estimated profit margin for the entrant is 27% in the 3
rd year of operation. 
The largest ISP Forthnet has reached 103,000 customers in mid 2007 from 2,328 
customers in February 2004, so that it could enjoy a margin of 30%. Is this margin 
insufficient? Certainly, the NRA should have waited before acting given the margins 
set by the incumbent. Furthermore, the NRA did not examine the dynamics of the 
market structure nor did it examine the evolution of market shares.  According to the 
Commission’s Guidance in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty “Competition is a 
dynamic process and an assessment of the competitive constraints on an undertaking 
cannot be based solely on the existing market situation….The market performance of 
the dominant undertaking and its competitors may provide direct evidence of anti-
competitive foreclosure. For reasons attributable to the allegedly abusive conduct, the 
market share of the dominant undertaking may have risen or a decline in market 
share may have been slowed”.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of market shares of the ISP’s for the relevant period. It 
is clear that the incumbent through its subsidiary OTEnet wasn’t dominant in the 
market for internet services. Also, the market shares of the three largest operators 
were increasing in the investigating period, i.e. from 2004 until March 2006. Also, the 
retail price of the incumbent was higher than that of entrants for the relevant period. 
This implies that there was always room for the entrants to cut prices even further and 
get a higher market share. 
 
 

































The Dutch Competition Authority (2001) has rejected margin squeeze allegations by a 
mobile service provider Talkline Benelux B.V. against the incumbent operator, KPN. 
Talkline argued that the prices applied by KPN make it impossible for an independent 
service provider to operate in a profitable manner). The Dutch Competition Authority 
rejected Talkline’s complaint by reasoning that there was evidence that several 
independent service providers who relied on access to KPN’s network, including 
Talkline, were able to operate on the market profitably. Unfortunately, in the present 
case, such a reasoning didn’t apply despite the fact that alternative providers were 
steadily increasing there customer base as is evident from Figure 2. 






























    
 
To intervene or to wait in an emerging market? 
 
If the NCA waits until the market has matured and stabilised and meanwhile an abuse 
is being practiced, there is a danger of weakening or destroying of competition. On 
the other hand if the NCA intervenes at an early stage when the market has not yet 
developed it may not have sufficiently available accounting data upon which to base a 
finding using the EEO test. Furthermore, it may deter investment in the market and 
invite inefficient entry. The EC has chosen to act early in the Wanadoo case as   
“…nothing in Article 82 of the Treaty or in the Community case law provides for an 
exception to the application of the competition rules to sectors which are not yet fully 
mature or which are considered to be emerging markets” (see Commission Decision 
(2003a) paragraph 301). 
However, the action was justified by the fact that the market shares of Wanadoo had 
reached 70%-80% in less than two years and were also steadily increasing. In the 
present case, in the market for fast internet services, the incumbent was not a 
dominant operator nor did it posses the largest market share as it was the second 
largest with a market share of 32.5%. Therefore, the investigation was conducted in a 
market where unlike other European cases, the incumbent wasn’t dominant and the 
alleged margin squeeze didn’t seem to affect the market as the number of subscribers 
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